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WHAT DO CHINESE CLIENTS WANT? 
Ji Li & Wei Zhang† 
Abstract 
The world’s two largest economies are locked in an 
escalating trade war, and caught in the crossfire are hundreds of 
Chinese multinational companies (MNCs) that have made substantial 
U.S. investments.  Facing heightened legal risks in a less hospitable 
environment, the Chinese MNCs increasingly depend on local 
lawyers.  Yet, their purchase of U.S. legal service, a topic of both 
practical and theoretical importance, has received little attention.  To 
fill the gap, this article empirically investigates how Chinese 
companies in the United States select their U.S. legal counsel.  By 
analyzing a unique dataset, the article finds that Chinese MNC 
managers uniformly prioritize candidates’ practical experience and 
ignore their educational credentials.  Legal fees matter, but to a much 
lesser degree than what one might infer from anecdotal evidence.  
Some Chinese MNC managers also pay close attention to a U.S. 
lawyer’s or law firm’s prestige, their Chinese or U.S. government 
background, and to lawyer recommendations by acquaintances or by 
the companies’ Chinese headquarters.  Further empirical analysis of 
lawyer selection preferences unveils variable connections with the 
ownership types of Chinese investors.  Sectoral regulation, in-house 
legal capacity, and U.S. investment size also correlate with one or 
several of the lawyer selection preferences.  The findings offer 
insights useful to U.S. lawyers and policymakers concerned with the 
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opportunities and threats posed by the global expansion of Chinese 
businesses and contribute to theoretical debates on multiple topics, 
such as emerging market MNCs and their impacts on the legal 
profession and the legal service market in the United States and other 
developed countries. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic globalization has profoundly reshaped the legal 
profession and the legal service market, and the subject has captured 
a great deal of scholarly attention.1  Yet, the vast existing literature 
has largely neglected the recent ascendance of Chinese multinational 
companies (MNCs).  In contrast to MNCs in earlier waves of business 
globalization, those from China have thrived in a home state 
environment characterized by a weak judiciary.  Moreover, Chinese 
MNCs have generally endured and sometimes even benefited from 
heavy-handed government intervention in corporate affairs and 
business dealings. 
Moving to developed host countries, Chinese MNCs 
encounter enormous institutional divides.  According to a Chinese 
MNC manager, “We came to invest [in the United States] for the rule 
of law, yet our biggest challenge here is also the rule of law.”2  To 
traverse the institutional gaps, Chinese MNCs inevitably rely on local 
legal professionals, especially now that the U.S. political and 
regulatory environment has turned more hostile due to the escalating 
trade war with China.  However, this ever-increasing demand for 
legal services, with its long-term impacts on the service market and 
the legal profession, has received little scholarly attention.  To begin 
to fill in the lacuna, this article empirically examines Chinese MNCs’ 
purchases of U.S. legal services. 
                                                                                                               
 1 See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Is the In-House Counsel Movement Going Global-A 
Preliminary Assessment of the Role of Internal Counsel in Emerging Economies, 2012 WIS. 
L. REV. 251, 271-72 (2012); David B. Wilkins & Mihaela Papa, The Rise of the Corporate 
Legal Elite in the BRICS: Implications for Global Governance, 54 B.C.L. REV. 1149, 1151 
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Distinctiveness in Globalization: U.S. Law Firms Go Glocal, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1431, 
1469-71 (2009). 
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(2018). 
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Our study comprises two sets of questions.  First, how do 
Chinese companies select their U.S. lawyers?  There has been a lot of 
research on related topics, such as the value of lawyers and the 
globalization of law firms.  Few scholars, however, have examined 
Chinese MNCs and their purchase of legal services.  Unlike foreign 
investors from the UK or Canada, Chinese businesses have flourished 
in a home state environment where law is often secondary to power 
and connections,3  and companies generally undervalue high-quality 
legal services.4  “In the Chinese legal system, where relationships are 
often more important in problem-solving than understanding the 
letter of the law, a Chinese lawyer who went to school with the 
minister can be more helpful than a U.S.-trained lawyer who 
understands the letter of the law.”5  Will Chinese MNCs in the United 
States demonstrate similar preferences when selecting U.S. lawyers?  
For instance, do they pay close attention to a U.S. lawyer’s 
government background? 
Second, as this article will show, intriguing inter-company 
variations exist among Chinese MNCs in their lawyer selection 
preferences.  We will propose and then test a number of possible 
explanations.  Since a defining feature of Chinese outbound foreign 
direct investment (FDI) is the prominent role of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), this article will explore whether Chinese 
investors with state ownership pay special attention to certain 
attributes of U.S. lawyer candidates. 
To address these two sets of questions, we examine a unique 
dataset derived from a comprehensive survey of Chinese MNCs in 
the United States.  The data provide an unprecedented window into 
multiple factors that Chinese MNC managers consider when 
selecting U.S. lawyers and enable statistical analyses of their 
preference variations. 
                                                                                                               
 3 See, e.g., Ji Li, The Power Logic of Justice in China, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 106 
(2017); Yuen Yuen Ang & Nan Jia, Perverse Complementarity: Political Connections and 
the Use of Courts Among Private Firms in China, 76 J. POL. 318, 320 (2014); Wei Zhang & 
Ji Li, Weak Law v. Strong Ties: An Empirical Study of Business Investment, Law and 
Political Connections in China, 13 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 9 (2017); Xin He & Kwai Hang Ng, 
“It Must Be Rock Strong!” Guanxi’s Impact on Judicial Decision Making in China, 65 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 841, 851 (2017). 
 4 Sida Liu, Client Influence and the Contingency of Professionalism: The Work of Elite 
Corporate Lawyers in China, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 751, 768 (2006). 
 5 Dennis M. Horn, Navigating China and U.S. Law—A Growing Practice Area, 18 
BUS. L. TODAY 51, 52 (2008). 
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II. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION, CHINESE FDI AND THE 
LEGAL SERVICE MARKET 
Before the recent political backlashes, MNCs were organizing 
their businesses on a global scale.  To serve their legal needs, many 
elite law firms have expanded their practices abroad.6  This type of 
globalization and its impact on the legal profession and the market 
for legal services have spawned a plethora of studies from diverse 
perspectives.  A few of them, for instance, touch on the various 
models adopted by law firms during their global expansion.7  Some 
develop their international practices through mergers with and 
acquisitions of foreign law firms,8 whereas others grow organically, 
sending home-trained lawyers to foreign offices to maintain, to the 
extent possible, a uniform work quality and culture.9  Another strand 
of the literature examines the convergence of commercial law 
practices as a result of the global expansion of law firms. 10   For 
instance, contracts adopted in international business transactions 
increasingly resemble the prototypes produced by elite U.S. and UK 
law firms.11  Still others research the interactions between expatriated 
lawyers and their local partners when elite firms establish 
international practices.12 
Although the debate has for years revolved around 
globalization and the legal profession of the United States and other 
                                                                                                               
 6 See, e.g., Janine Griffiths-Baker & Nancy J Moore, Regulating Conflicts of Interest 
in Global Law Firms: Peace in Our Time, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2541-42 (providing 
an overview of how law firms transform globally) (2011); see also Stern & Li, supra note 1, 
at 205. 
 7 See, e.g., Carole Silver, Local Matters: Internationalizing Strategies for US Law 
Firms, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 67 74 (2007) (discussing the values U.S. based firms 
emphasized when they develop from national to multinational); STERN & LI, supra note 1, 
at 205. 
 8 William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 5, 9 
(2014) (providing an example of the purchase of Pangea3 by Thomson Reuters). 
 9 SILVER, supra note 7, at 83. 
 10 See generally Daniel D. Sokol, Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the 
Literature and a Research Agenda for Further Study, 41 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5, 8 
(2007) (explaining how the importance of New York corporate law drives the globalization 
of U.S. based firms). 
 11 Id. at 26–27. 
 12 Jonathan V. Beaverstock, ‘Managing Across Borders’: Knowledge Management and 
Expatriation in Professional Service Legal Firms, 4 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 157, 169-72 (2004) 
(explaining expatriation and relationships with local staff). 
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developed countries,13 a burgeoning literature has recently turned to 
developing countries.14  Chinese law firms, for instance, have been 
growing exponentially, and some of them have, through mergers or 
close partnerships with foreign firms, started global practices. 15  
Meanwhile, as a major base for service outsourcing, India assumes a 
crucial role in the globalized legal market.16  In both China and India, 
changes in the legal profession resonate with the transformation of 
the global economic order.17 
Insightful as these studies are, scholars have largely 
overlooked the recent expansion of Chinese MNCs into developed 
countries.  Before the onset of the trade wars, Chinese investment 
outflow was multiplying at an exponential rate18 and Chinese MNCs 
increasingly targeted mature and competitive markets.19  Against that 
backdrop, Chinese FDI in the United States grew at an annual rate of 
32% from 2010 to 2015, and in 2016 alone, the total investment 
doubled to $46 billion. 20   While new investment from China 
plummeted thereafter, hundreds of Chinese MNCs had already made 
                                                                                                               
 13 Sida Liu, The Legal Profession as a Social Process: A Theory on Lawyers and 
Globalization, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 670, 681 (2013). 
 14 See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Corporate Lawyers in Emerging Markets, 12 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 441, 442-43 (2016) (providing an overview of the growth of multinational 
global law firms in developping countries). 
 15 LIU, supra note 13, at 684. 
 16 See, e.g., Mihaela Papa & David B Wilkins, Globalization, Lawyers and India: 
Toward a Theoretical Synthesis of Globalization Studies and the Sociology of the Legal 
Profession, 18 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 175, 179 (2011); Leonard Bierman & Michael A Hitt, 
The Globalization of Legal Practice in the Internet Age, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 
30 (2007). 
 17 LIU, supra note 13, at 684; Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant Garth, Lawyers and the legal 
profession, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND SOCIETY 105, 114-15 (2015). 
 18 Karl Sauvant, Challenges for China’s Outward FDI, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 31, 2013, 
07:10 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-10/31/content_17070440.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X2KK-XWWK]. 
 19 See, e.g., S. Globerman & D. Shapiro, Economic and Strategic Considerations 
Surrounding Chinese FDI in the United States, 26 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 163, 164 (2009); 
Andreas Klossek et al., Chinese Enterprises in Germany: Establishment Modes and 
Strategies to Mitigate the Liability of Foreignness, 47 J. WORLD BUS. 35, 38 (2012); Ji Li, I 
Came, I Saw, I . . . Adapted an Empirical Study of Chinese Business Expansion in the U.S. 
and Its Legal and Policy Implications, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 143, 147-49 (2016); see 
also Carlo Pietrobelli et al., Chinese FDI Strategy in Italy: The ‘Marco Polo’ Effect, 4 INT’L 
J. TECH. LEARNING, INNOVATION & DEV. 277, 281 (2011). 
 20 Thilo Hanemann & Daniel H. Rosen, New Neighbors: 2017 Update Chinese 
Investment in the United States by Congressional District, NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON U.S.-
CHINA RELATIONS & RHODIUM GROUP, Apr. 24, 2017, at 1. 
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investments in the United States, and most of them intend to weather 
the ongoing trade war. 
Unsurprisingly, one of the most daunting challenges for 
Chinese MNCs is to cross the vast legal and regulatory gaps between 
the two countries.  Given the rapid transformation of the Chinese 
economy, all China-based MNCs are nouveaux riches that have 
thrived in an institutional context where law is secondary to power.21  
Accustomed to such a legal environment at home, Chinese MNCs 
confront a huge institutional divide when entering the U.S. market, 
where formal laws govern most everyday corporate affairs and 
commercial dealings.  To adapt to the new institutional setting, 
Chinese MNCs have to rely heavily on local legal professionals.  How, 
then, do they make their selection of U.S. lawyers? 
III. WHAT DO CHINESE CLIENTS WANT? 
Anecdotal evidence has portrayed Chinese MNCs as reluctant 
consumers of high-quality professional services, including legal 
services, and has ascribed this reluctance to mindset inertia. 22  
Because of the peripheral role of law in China’s domestic setting, 
Chinese managers fail to adequately comprehend or assess legal risks 
in host countries where law does matter.23  Following this argument, 
one would reasonably presume that Chinese MNCs undervalue legal 
services in the United States.  To evaluate this speculation, we 
examine unique empirical evidence about lawyer selection 
preferences revealed by Chinese MNC managers in the United States. 
A. Possible Factors to Consider in U.S. Lawyer Selection 
With more than 1.3 million registered lawyers, 24  the U.S. 
legal service market should be able to meet any of Chinese MNCs’ 
                                                                                                               
 21 Ji Li, The Power Logic of Justice in China, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 118-119 (2017) 
(providing a hypothetical commercial dispute example to illustrate the significance of power 
over law). 
 22 Weifeng Ni et al. (倪伟峰等), Zhongtie Jinjun Ouzhou Zheji Bolan: Zenyang Gaoza 
Haiwai Xiangmu (中铁进军欧洲折戟波兰：怎样搞砸海外项目 ) [China Railway 
Engineering Corporation Enters the European Market but Fails in Poland: How to Screw 
up Overseas Projects], CAIXIN CENTURY (XINSHIJI) (July. 25. 2011, 12:18 PM), 
http://magazine.caixin.com/2011-07-23/100282935.html [https://perma.cc/M5HK-RK5J]. 
 23 Id. 
 24 AM. B. ASS’N, ABA NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY: HISTORICAL TREND IN 
TOTAL NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION 1878-2019, 
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needs.  But what are Chinese MNCs looking for in a U.S. lawyer?  
For most corporate clients, the ultimate objective of lawyer selection 
is to facilitate business transactions and limit legal risks.  So, their 
selection cannot be analyzed in isolation from recurrent legal issues 
and legal service needs arising from their business transactions. 
In addition, once their legal service needs have been identified, 
corporate clients face the challenge of effectively identifying U.S. 
lawyers capable of providing the appropriate services at an optimal 
quality to price ratio.  Let us begin with the attorney’s fee.  Price plays 
an essential part in any service market, and the U.S. market for legal 
services is no exception.25  In selecting U.S. lawyers, Chinese MNC 
managers may be even more cost sensitive.  Comparatively speaking, 
the Chinese legal service market is underdeveloped, and corporate 
clients in China place “ruthless cost pressure” on legal services.26  To 
earn business, law firms in China, even many elite international firms, 
have to cap their fees or adopt flexible billing methods.27  Having 
been used to such practices at home, Chinese companies in the United 
States may regard U.S. legal services as exorbitantly expensive and 
therefore be more mindful of the price factor. 
Besides attorney fees, Chinese investors may also prefer U.S. 
lawyers with rich practical experiences.  This preference is 
commonsensical, as experience constitutes a core value of legal 
services.28   Recent research even suggests, despite the doomsday 
predictions, 29  Big Law continues to thrive because these firms’ 
accumulated deal experiences offer precious information on deal 
                                                                                                               
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/total-
national-lawyer-population-1878-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD8U-MTS2]. 
 25 See, e.g., John C. Coates et al., Hiring Teams, Firms, and Lawyers: Evidence of the 
Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY. 999, 1012 
(2011); Elisabeth de Fontenay, Agency Costs in Law-Firm Selection: Are Companies Under-
Spending on Counsel?, 11 CAP. MKT. L. J. 486, 496–502 (2016); STERN & LI, supra note 1, 
at 194–96. 
 26 WILKINS, supra note 1, at 293. 
 27 See, e.g., Tom Brennan, What It Takes to Win—and Keep—Clients in Asia, ASIAN 
LAW. (2015), https://www.law.com/home/id=1202736565435/?slreturn=20180715144826 
[https://perma.cc/AZ6T-ERGY]; LIU, supra note 4, at 762–63. 
 28 See, e.g., COATES ET AL., supra note 25, at 1011–17; see also CNV Krishnan & 
Ronald W Masulis, Law Firm Expertise and Merger and Acquisition Outcomes, 56 J. L. & 
ECON. 189, 190–92 (2013) (providing examples in the M&A context). 
 29 See Larry E Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749 (2010) 
(explainning the reasons and the effects of failing big law firms). 
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terms.30  However, the importance of practical experience may not be 
obvious to Chinese corporate clients.  As just noted, in China, where 
law is secondary to political connections,31  clients typically under-
appreciate the value of premium legal services. 32   Expatriated 
Chinese managers may retain this attitude.  Yet, theories also exist 
that predict the opposite.  International business research has long 
documented isomorphism when companies expand overseas.33 
Besides attorney fees and practical experience, Chinese 
clients may also take into consideration a U.S. lawyer’s Chinese 
background.  First, the ability to speak Chinese may be a plus.  Senior 
Chinese executives at Chinese MNCs in their late 40s and 50s went 
to school in China decades ago, when English was either entirely 
excluded from the curriculum or poorly taught.  These clients 
naturally prefer U.S. lawyers capable of explaining key legal issues 
in Chinese so that they may assess all pertinent risks.  Moreover, 
words used in ordinary life may nevertheless carry intricate 
connotations in the legal context.  Chary of being disadvantaged in 
negotiations, even those Chinese executives who can speak English 
well may still choose to communicate in their mother tongue.  In 
China, Chinese clients of international law firms “increasingly 
demand that all communications, spoken and written, be in 
Mandarin.” 34   Why not demand the same in the United States?  
Besides language, cultural differences may also impact the 
                                                                                                               
 30 Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional 
Lawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 420 (2015) (explaining how repeat-player law firms can 
extract significant rents by aggregating and deploying private information about market 
transaction terms). 
 31 See, e.g., ANG & JIA, supra note 3, at 328–29; ZHANG & LI, supra note 3, at 31–33. 
 32 Tom Brennan, What It Takes to Win—and Keep—Clients in Asia, ASIAN LAW. (2015), 
https://www.law.com/home/id=1202736565435/?slreturn=20180715144826 
[https://perma.cc/R22R-9EVL]. 
 33 See, e.g., Lin Cui & Fuming Jiang, State Ownership Effect on Firms’ FDI Ownership 
Decisions Under Institutional Pressure: A Study of Chinese Outward Investing Firms, 43 J. 
INT’L BUS. STUD. 264, 279–81 (2012); Chuck CY Kwok & Solomon Tadesse, The MNC as 
an Agent of Change for Host-Country Institutions: FDI and Corruption, 37 J. INT’L BUS. 
STUD. 767, 769–70 (2006); see also Salomon Robert & Zheying Wu, Institutional Distance 
and Local Isomorphism Strategy, 43 J INT’L BUS. STUD. 343, 362–64 (2012). 
 34 Tom Brennan, What It Takes to Win—and Keep—Clients in Asia, ASIAN LAW. (Sept. 
6, 2015, 8:48 AM), https://www.law.com/sites/articles/2015/09/06/what-it-takes-to-win-
and-keep-clients-in-asia [https://perma.cc/G9KZ-9T2Q]. 
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relationships between U.S. lawyers and foreign clients.35  And a U.S. 
lawyer’s Chinese background should help narrow that gap. 
The U.S. market for legal services, though large and 
competitive, is highly imperfect. 36   Clients, confronting immense 
information asymmetry, are usually unable to assess the quality of 
legal services.37  In addition, legal service is a typical credence good 
in that even seasoned corporate clients may not be able to adequately 
evaluate its quality even after its completion.38  The task is even more 
daunting for Chinese MNCs unfamiliar with the U.S. legal market.  
To address this issue, Chinese managers may pay close attention to 
signals of U.S. lawyers’ competence and the quality of their services.  
Educational credentials have long been deemed as effective signals 
of desirable attributes, such as intelligence and diligence.39  Mindful 
of the crucial signaling value, U.S. law firms have paid fastidious 
attention to job candidates’ pedigrees.40  Chinese managers, hailing 
from a culture that treasures education, may care a great deal about 
where their lawyers received their law degrees. 
In addition, a U.S. lawyer’s or a law firm’s prestige can “offer 
a type of informal insurance to a potential client.  If an important and 
complex transaction or litigation does not go well, directors, the CEO, 
and others in a corporation will be less likely to second-guess the 
decision of the general counsel to retain a charmed circle firm.”41  
Because “nobody ever got fired for hiring Skadden,” MNC managers 
or their in-house counsels naturally prefer legal professionals with 
                                                                                                               
 35 LIU, supra note 4, at 777; Robert J. Walters, Now That I Ate the Sushi, Do We Have 
a Deal—The Lawyer as Negotiator in Japanese-US Business Transactions, 12 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 335, 335 (1991). 
 36 Jack Ladinsky, The Traffic in Legal Services: Lawyer-Seeking Behavior and the 
Channeling of Clients, 11 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 207, 215 (1976) (illustrating the inefficient 
distribution of legal services). 
 37 See, e.g., Asher Wolinsky, Competition in Markets for Credence Goods, J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 117, 127–30 (1995); Ronald J Gilson, The Devolution 
of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 889 (1990). 
 38 GILSON, supra note 37, at 889-90. 
 39 Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, in UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMICS 283, 287–96 
(Peter Diamond & Michael Rothschild, 1978) (using statistical models to explain market 
signaling regarding the level of education) . 
 40 William D. Henderson, The Bursting of the Pedigree Bubble, DIGITAL REPOSITORY 
@ MAURER LAW (July, 2009), 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=facpub 
[https://perma.cc/U863-EJD3] (using Cravath as an example to illustrate law firm’s attention 
to pedigrees). 
 41 SOKOL, supra note 10, at 27. 
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stellar reputations.42  In addition, as outsiders with a limited track 
record, Chinese MNCs may use prestigious law firms as “reputational 
intermediaries” to impress potential U.S. business partners.43 
Chinese investors may also rely on recommendations from 
trusted third parties to remedy their information asymmetry.  Prior 
research has documented the role of informal networks and 
influential intermediaries in supplying information about legal 
services.44  To many, informal referrals offer qualitative, inexpensive, 
and tailored information not easily available through formal 
channels. 45   From the perspective of Chinese MNC managers, 
endorsements from parties in long-term cooperative relationships 
also function as quality assurance because a reference to inferior 
lawyers may reflect negatively on the credibility and the intention of 
the acquaintances and jeopardize their established relationships.46 
Moreover, local MNC managers may pay close attention to 
lawyer recommendations from their Chinese headquarters.  
According to a prior study, Chinese SOEs often use outside legal 
counsels suggested by their corporate leaders or the leaders of 
superior state agencies.47  The rationale behind it, i.e., hierarchical 
control within the business organization, remains intact when the 
companies expand abroad.48  So, managers running the U.S. show 
might favor lawyers well-connected to their companies’ headquarters.  
However, in purchasing U.S. legal services, are managers in China 
better positioned to overcome the information asymmetry than their 
local colleagues?  We find conflicting hypotheses.  On the one hand, 
elite international law firms have operated in China for years and 
have advised many of the largest Chinese companies on issues 
                                                                                                               
 42 Henderson, supra note 8, at 15. Bruce MacEwen, Nobody Ever Got Fired For Hiring 
Skadden, Adam Smith, Esq., (Apr. 21, 2004), 
https://adamsmithesq.com/2004/04/nobody_ever_got [https://perma.cc/864E-7EGT]. 
 43 See, e.g., Karl S Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15 
(1995); Ronald J Gilson & Reinier H Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 1984 
VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Reinier H Kraakman, Gatekeepers: the Anatomy of a Third-party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L., ECON., & ORGANIZATION 53 (1986). 
 44 LADINSKY, supra note 36, at 213. 
 45 Id. at 218. 
 46 Ronald J Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side 
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 896 (1990) (discussing how reference to inferior lawyers 
may destroy long-term attorney-client relationship). 
 47 Sida Liu, Palace Wars Over Professional Regulation: In-house Counsel in Chinese 
State-owned Enterprises, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 549, 564 (2012). 
 48 LI, supra note 2, at 85. 
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concerning U.S. law or even Chinese law.49  Such prior dealings, 
which narrow the information gap between Chinese corporate clients 
and providers of U.S. legal services, may benefit these law firms now 
that Chinese MNCs are expanding to the United States.  On the other 
hand, lawyer selection based on headquarters’ recommendations may 
be suboptimal.   Executives in China cannot be fully privy to the local 
legal predicaments of their U.S. affiliates and their peculiar service 
needs.  In addition, influence costs, which are common among large 
business organizations, may impair the efficiency of U.S. lawyer 
recommendations by Chinese headquarters. 50   Either way, 
headquarters’ recommendations may be an important factor to 
consider. 
Furthermore, Chinese investors may prefer U.S. lawyers with 
some government background.  Back in China, connections with 
government officials solve thorny legal problems more effectively 
than legal knowledge and skills do.  Chinese managers previously 
immersed in such an environment may preserve and apply this 
cognitive mindset to resolving their legal issues in the United States.  
Moreover, Chinese MNCs, especially those with state ownership, 
suffer a trust deficiency in the United States, especially in the current 
circumstances.51  Hence, rational Chinese managers in the United 
States may prefer to hire lawyers with government backgrounds to 
allay this mistrust.  In addition, the preference for U.S. lawyers with 
government backgrounds may simply reflect a general intent to 
manage compliance risks and regulatory costs.  Prior empirical 
research has shown that “transactional lawyers add value by reducing 
regulatory costs.”52  After all, “much of lawyers’ expertise consists 
of insider knowledge of the local legal system and social connections 
with law enforcement officials.” 53   Arguably, lawyers who have 
                                                                                                               
 49 See generally Rachel Stern & Su Li, The Outpost Office: How International Law 
Firms Approach the China Market, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 184 (2015); Sida Liu, 
Globalization as Boundary-Blurring: International and Local Law Firms in China’s 
Corporate Law, 42 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 771 (2008). 
 50 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the 
Organization of Economic Activity, PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 57, 58 
(1990). 
 51 Klaus E. Meyer et al., Overcoming Distrust: How State-Owned Enterprises Adapt 
Their Foreign Entries to Institutional Pressures Abroad, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 486, 488 
(2014). 
 52 Steven L Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J. 
L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 492 (2006). 
 53 LIU, supra note 13, at 670. 
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previously worked at regulatory agencies have better knowledge of 
decision-making mechanisms and access to decision-making 
agents.54 
To summarize, in selecting U.S. lawyers, Chinese MNCs may 
take into account myriad factors, including legal fees, professional 
reputation, academic credentials, practice experience, Chinese 
background, U.S. government background, and recommendations 
from acquaintances and Chinese headquarters.  All corporate clients, 
regardless of their nationality, seek high-quality and reasonably 
priced legal services, hence the attention to U.S. lawyers’ practice 
experience and fees.  Legal services being credence goods, average 
Chinese companies suffer acute information asymmetry in assessing 
the quality of U.S. legal services and making optimal purchases.  To 
ameliorate this issue, Chinese managers may rely on professional 
reputation, academic credentials, and referrals from trusted parties.  
In addition, due to the gaps between the two countries, some Chinese 
MNC managers may benefit from lawyers with Chinese and U.S. 
government backgrounds. 
Because U.S. lawyer selection typically hinges on multiple 
factors, how they rank relative to each other is crucial to drawing 
inferences of any practical, policy, and theoretical significance.  In 
the next subsection, we analyze a unique dataset derived from a 
comprehensive survey of Chinese companies in the United States.  
Before proceeding, however, it merits noting that the eight factors are 
not necessarily independent of each other or mutually exclusive.  A 
lawyer’s reputation, for instance, inevitably correlates with practice 
experience, which in turn relates to legal fees.  That being said, the 
                                                                                                               
 54 Though few scholars have systematically explored this type of preference, several 
prior studies have made such findings. For instance, the Revolving Door literature about 
lobbyists demonstrates that the “brokers” between politics and money tend to have 
substantial government experience. JOHN P HEINZ, THE HOLLOW CORE: PRIVATE INTERESTS 
IN NATIONAL POLICY MAKING (1993). Also, lawyers with government backgrounds dominate 
a fast growing experience in white-collar crimes. Charles D Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s 
Sixth Amendment: The Rise of Corporate White-Collar Practices in Large US Law Firms, 
53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1221, (2011). In addition, the group of professionals that specialize in 
advising foreign investors on the national security review process (also known as the CFIUS 
review) consist primarily of former federal agency staffers. Diane Bartz & Greg Roumeliotis, 
The Washington Insiders Who Work to Get Chinese Deals Approved, REUTERS (Feb. 24. 
2016, 2:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-deals-advisors-insight/the-
washington-insiders-who-work-to-get-chinese-deals-approved-idUSKCN0VX2PX 
[https://perma.cc/J8Q5-DBXC]. 
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correlations between the factors that exhibit inter-company variations 
are limited.55 
B. Data on Lawyer Selection Preferences 
This empirical study relies primarily on unique survey data 
about Chinese companies in the United States.  The survey was 
conducted in 2017 in collaboration with the China General Chamber 
of Commerce (CGCC), by far the largest business association of 
Chinese companies in the United States.56  The survey instrument 
contains ninety-four questions that cover a broad range of topics.57  
The questionnaires were prepared in simplified Chinese and were 
distributed to most CGCC members.  The vast majority of the CGCC 
board directors completed the questionnaires, ensuring a sample that 
is highly diverse in multiple dimensions, such as sector, ownership 
type, and investment location. 
The survey contains a multiple-choice question inquiring 
about the major factor(s) Chinese MNC managers would consider in 
the selection of U.S. lawyers.58  As shown in Figure 1, almost all of 
the respondents (92.7%) consider a local lawyer’s practice experience 
important, which indicates that Chinese managers appreciate the 
importance of high-quality legal service.  Legal fees are also 
important to Chinese executives, but to a much lesser degree (50.3%).  
A significant minority of Chinese managers also consider 
professional reputation important in selecting U.S. lawyers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                               
 55 Two factors considered important by Chinese executives, i.e., practice experience 
and educational credentials, do not vary much across different survey respondents; and given 
that the former is close to one and the latter to zero, they are highly correlated. 
 56 The list of CGCC board members is available at 
http://www.cgccusa.org/about/governance/ [https://perma.cc/8QXM-2JDR]. 
 57 The annual survey is the fourth one. The comprehensive CGCC survey was 
conducted in 2014. 
 58 The original survey question in simplified Chinese is as follows. [选择美国律师的
主要考虑因素（可多选）: 律师费用; 律师在相关行业的经验; 律师学历; 律师有中国
背景; 律师有美国政府背景; 律师或律师所在律所的名气; 律师有熟人推荐；律师由中
国总部推荐；其他。] 
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Figure 1: Major factors considered in selecting lawyers in the United 
States 
 
Data source: CGCC 2017 Survey (177 responses to this multiple-choice question) 
About one-fifth of the Chinese managers would take lawyer 
recommendations from their acquaintances into consideration.  Such 
endorsement, which may be solicited from business partners, current 
or former colleagues, and other trusted third parties, remedies the 
information shortage for some Chinese executives. 
Also, nearly 20% of the survey respondents prefer their 
lawyers in the United States to have some Chinese background.  As 
noted earlier, a Chinese background may narrow the institutional 
divide between U.S. lawyers and Chinese managers.  Aware of this 
preference, U.S. law firms with substantial international practices, 
especially those keen on soliciting business from Chinese clients, 
have begun to hire or promote senior lawyers with Chinese 
backgrounds to work in their U.S. offices.59 
About 12% of the Chinese managers would prefer U.S. 
lawyers with government backgrounds.  As noted, the market for 
                                                                                                               
 59 For example, Morrison & Forrester LLP recently recruited an experienced lawyer 
with a Chinese background from another firm to be a partner at its New York office, because 
his “substantial experience advising foreign banking organizations, particularly Chinese 
financial institutions, combined with our strong presence in Asia, make him a great asset to 
our clients and our firm.” New York Office, Bank Regulatory Partner Joins Morrison & 
Foerster, Press Release, Morrison & Forrester LLP (Apr. 23, 2015), 
https://www.mofo.com/resources/press-releases/bank-regulatory-partner-joins-morrison-
foerster.html [https://perma.cc/H5SA-JB8N]. 
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legal services values lawyers with extensive work experience in a 
powerful federal agency.60  Besides their insider knowledge, lawyers 
with government background should help mitigate suspicion about 
companies from a non-ally country, especially state-owned 
companies.  But why only 12%?  Don’t all Chinese investors suffer a 
trust deficiency in the U.S. market?  The next section will statistically 
analyze a few hypothetical answers. 
Roughly 11% of the Chinese executives consider 
recommendations from Chinese headquarters an important factor in 
selecting U.S. lawyers.  Only a fraction of Chinese MNCs have 
previously worked with U.S. law firms.  Those without such 
experience are less likely to make lawyer recommendations in the 
first place.  Also, Chinese MNCs vary in the extent to which their 
headquarters control U.S. operations.  Some monitor them closely, 
but others fully delegate to the local managers, in which case the 
headquarters would refrain from intervening in the selection of U.S. 
lawyers.61 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Chinese managers largely ignore 
U.S. lawyers’ educational credentials.  For Chinese executives, it is 
possible that the signaling value of education is indirect and 
tangential compared to a law firm’s prestige and professional 
licensing requirements.  After all, not many Chinese managers could 
recognize the quality difference between a top-twenty and a top-fifty 
U.S. law school.  The attention to practice experience probably 
explains the inattention to credentials. 
To summarize, in selecting U.S. lawyers, Chinese managers 
almost uniformly value candidates’ practice experience.  About half 
also consider legal fees important.  In decreasing order of likelihood, 
Chinese managers also pay attention to prestige, recommendations by 
acquaintances, Chinese background, recommendations from Chinese 
headquarters, and U.S. government background.  Very few consider 
U.S. lawyers’ educational credentials.  The aggregated data offer a 
unique panoramic view of the lawyer selection preferences expressed 
by Chinese MNCs in the United States.  The finding sheds valuable 
                                                                                                               
 60 See, e.g., Sharyn L Roach, Men and Women Lawyers in In-house Legal Departments: 
Recruitment and Career Patterns, 4 GENDER & SOC. 207 (1990) (investigating 
interorganizational differences in recruitment and career patterns of men and women lawyers 
within in-house legal departments); WEISSELBERG & LI, supra note 54, at 1221 (studying 
movement of partners between governments and other firms). 
 61 LI, supra note 2, at 103. 
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light on Chinese investors’ service demands and the potential impacts 
thereof on the U.S. legal profession and the legal service market.  
Meanwhile, the data reveal puzzling company-level variations that 
will be examined in the following section. 
IV. WHY ARE CHINESE CLIENTS ALL DIFFERENT? 
The survey data from Section III illustrate significant inter-
company variations in the lawyer selection preferences of Chinese 
MNCs in the United States, which raise important questions 
unexplored by the existing literature.  This section empirically 
examines a series of hypotheses in four parallel subparts, each of 
which explores a theoretically significant consideration (fee, prestige, 
headquarter recommendation, and government background) that 
varies across different Chinese MNCs. 
A. Legal Fees 
As shown in Figure 1, a slight majority (50.3%) of the survey 
respondents consider legal fees important for choosing U.S. lawyers.  
Those familiar with the Chinese legal service market may find this 
result puzzling— why do the other 50% downplay the significance of 
legal costs?  This subsection proposes and then tests a number of 
hypothetical answers.  To that end, we create a dummy dependent 
variable that equals one, if a respondent considers legal fees 
important in choosing U.S. lawyers, and zero otherwise.62  Based on 
existing literature and anecdotal evidence, we formulate a list of 
factors that may bear on the dependent variable. 
State ownership in Chinese investors.  Drawing on insights 
from the literature on SOEs, we hypothesize that legal fee sensitivity 
is associated with the ownership structure of Chinese MNCs.  
However, such theories point in opposite directions.  Multiple-agency 
                                                                                                               
 62 177 respondents answered this question, and, as noted, about half of them consider 
legal fees important (See  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1). 
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problems plague Chinese SOEs and lead to an acute misalignment of 
interests between managers and owners. 63   Though the alleged 
ownership of SOEs is vested in “the people,”64 it is agents appointed 
by certain government bodies that exercise real control over the 
management.  The government bodies in turn face their own agency 
problems.  Due to complex, multi-layered agency issues, SOE 
managers may heavily discount corporate cost savings.  Hence, U.S. 
legal fees, unhinged to the remuneration of SOE managers, may not 
catch their attention. 
However, the same multiple-agency problems give rise to an 
opposing hypothesis.  Due to severe interest misalignment, Chinese 
companies with substantial state ownership often resemble 
government bureaucracies in terms of operations and organizational 
form.  Compared to private firms, SOEs rely more heavily on 
measurable metrics such as legal fees to manage their operations.  
Embedded in a strict governance hierarchy, SOEs’ employees are 
always mindful of ex-post scrutiny from the upper echelons when 
acting ex ante.  Bureaucratic institutions in China pay close attention 
to performance indicators,65 and managers of Chinese SOEs should 
be no exception in this regard. In other words, managers of state-
owned MNCs may prefer fee-based lawyer selection to selection 
using more subtle criteria such as service quality or long-term 
corporate benefits.66  In short, highly risk-averse managers at state-
owned Chinese companies may pay more attention to fees than their 
counterparts at other firms. 
To test these two conflicting hypothetical ties between state 
ownership and Chinese MNC managers’ U.S. legal fee sensitivity, 
we create a dummy independent variable and assign it the value of 
one if a Chinese government entity owns more than 50% of a Chinese 
investor’s equity interest and zero otherwise.  Majority equity interest 
                                                                                                               
 63 Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra et al., Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational 
Companies, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 919, 931 (2014). 
 64 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Guoyou Zichan Fa (中华人民共和国企业国
有资产法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, effective May 1, 
2009) 2008 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 5 (China), art. 3, 
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2008-10/28/content_1134207.htm [https://perma.cc/HY34-ZXFM]. 
 65 Wei Zhang, Managing Judges Mathematically: an Empirical Study of the Medical 
Malpractice Litigations in Shanghai, 28 CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 373, 374-75 
(2017). 
 66 DE FONTENAY, supra note 30, at 486. 
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in theory enables corporate control over the investor’s actions in the 
United States, yet it may not be a sine qua non for the home state 
government to exert influence. 67   Thus, we code an alternative 
dummy variable to capture more extensive and subtle state control, 
which equals one if the Chinese government owns more than 10% of 
the investor and zero otherwise.  
Sectoral regulation.  Besides state ownership, the regulatory 
intensity of the sectors in which Chinese companies operate may also 
have an effect on their legal fee sensitivity.  Prior literature has 
documented that corporate clients are less cost-conscious when 
purchasing legal services for “betting the company” matters.68  In 
heavily regulated sectors such as banking, high-stakes matters 
abound, and companies tend to regard legal expenses as a necessary 
and ordinary operational expense.  Hence, Chinese companies 
operating in heavily regulated sectors may downplay the importance 
of legal fees.  By contrast, companies in less-regulated sectors 
encounter routine and standardized legal matters that can be handled 
by average lawyers.  The managers can therefore afford pivoting 
lawyer selection on fee difference.  To assess this hypothetical tie 
between sectoral regulation and legal fee sensitivity, we create a 
dummy variable that equals one if a Chinese company invests in a 
heavily regulated sector in the United States and zero otherwise.  Of 
the nineteen sectors listed in the 2017 survey questionnaire, we 
categorize the following eight as heavily regulated at the federal level, 
at the state and local level, or both: mining, utilities, construction, 
information technology, finance and insurance, real estate and rental, 
health care, and public administration.69 
Size of U.S. investment.  The size of U.S. investment may 
relate to legal fee sensitivity.  Presumably, the legal service demands 
of Chinese companies with extensive U.S. operations would differ 
from the demands of those merely testing the market.  Yet, one may 
                                                                                                               
 67 See, e.g., Curtis J Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism 
and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L. J. 665, 669 (2014) (Chinese state capitalism can be better 
explained by capture of the state than by ownership of enterprise); Ji Li, State-Owned 
Enterprises in the Current Regime of Investor-State Arbitration, in 380 STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES IN THE CURRENT REGIME OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (Brill Nijhoff, 
2014). 
 68 COATES ET AL., supra note 25, at 999. 
 69 Some may not consider real estate and rental industry as heavily regulated. We create 
an alternative dummy that excludes that sector and rerun all the tests using the alternative 
dummy. All the regression results remain largely the same. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss1/9
104 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
 
conceive opposing effects of investment size.  On the one hand, a 
company’s purchasing power, which is approximated by investment 
size, should affect the consumption of legal services.  Large Chinese 
MNCs with a considerable legal expense budget may care less about 
fee rates in lawyer selection.  On the other hand, everything else being 
equal, a high demand for U.S. legal services may justify strict cost 
control, e.g., institutionalized assessment and approval of outside 
counsels.  Such control may elevate managers’ attention to legal fees.  
To test the conflicting hypothetical effects of U.S. investment size on 
legal fee sensitivity, we code and add to the statistical tests the 
variable of a Chinese MNC’s U.S. revenue.70 
Duration of U.S. investment.  As noted earlier, mindset inertia 
may manifest in fee sensitivity.  Therefore, Chinese companies that 
entered the U.S. market earlier have adapted to the local business 
environment’s high legal fees.  By contrast, Chinese MNCs that have 
just ventured abroad might, given the undervaluation of legal services 
in China, pay close attention to fees when selecting lawyers.  To test 
this hypothesis, we include the duration of a Chinese MNC’s 
investment in the United States. 
Length of time working in the United States.  How long a 
Chinese manager has worked in the United States might also bear on 
fee sensitivity.  Those affiliates that have recently relocated to the 
United States may continue to apply the domestic standard and 
therefore weigh legal fees heavily in selecting lawyers.  By contrast, 
those who have worked for years in the United States may have 
internalized the local norms regarding legal service cost. 
Investment motive.  One may also assess normative adaptation 
through Chinese MNCs’ investment motives.  A company that 
follows its existing Chinese customers to the United States is 
presumably less integrated into the U.S. business community, and the 
lack of frequent interactions with the local community might hinder 
Chinese MNC managers’ normative conformation.   One survey 
question about the respondents’ investment motives, and among the 
choices is “to serve existing Chinese clients’ needs in the United 
States.”  Forty-five out of 198 (22.7%) survey respondents made that 
                                                                                                               
 70 In earlier surveys we asked for exact revenue amount of the Chinese companies, yet 
the response rate for the question was very low. The respondents were reluctant to disclose 
the figure. To address that issue, we made it a scale question. That raised the response rate 
significantly. Survey respondents choose one of five levels of revenue. The lowest level is 
“below one million dollars” and the highest level is “above 100 million dollars.” 
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selection (See Table 1).  To evaluate this hypothesis, we create a 
dummy variable and assign it the value of one if a Chinese company 
is “dragged” to the U.S. market by its Chinese customers and zero 
otherwise. 
In-house counsel.  Legal fee sensitivity may also be 
associated with the availability of in-house lawyers.  In the past few 
decades, the rise in U.S. corporations’ in-house capacity has reshaped 
their relationships with law firms.71  The information asymmetry is 
essentially internalized to favor in-house lawyers.72  Hence, in U.S. 
companies equipped with in-house lawyers, general counsels or their 
deputies have assumed a crucial role in the selection of outside 
lawyers and the purchase of legal services.73  In light of this literature, 
we postulate that the availability of corporate counsels at Chinese 
MNCs in the United States may be associated with their legal fee 
sensitivity.  First, in-house counsel can be regarded as a proxy for the 
amount and complexity of legal issues facing a Chinese MNC.  And 
those confronting frequent and complex legal issues in the United 
States may downplay legal fees.  Second, the availability of in-house 
counsel may signal relevant managerial attitudes; everything else 
being equal, Chinese companies with full-time internal legal staff 
might take legal and compliance matters more seriously than those 
without.  Such an attitude might be reflected in less weight being 
assigned to attorney fees.  Third, in-house counsels, many of whom 
are local lawyers themselves, tend to adopt the norms of the U.S. legal 
market regarding legal fees.  To test these hypothetical connections 
between internal legal capacity and varying fee sensitivity, we create 
a dummy variable that equals one if a responding MNC has full-time 
in-house counsel licensed to practice law in the United States and 
zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                               
 71 COATES ET AL., supra note 25, at 1001; see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Who’s in the 
House? The Changing Role and Nature of In-House and General Counsel, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 
237, 238-43 (2012). 
 72 Ronald J Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 
94 YALE L. J. 239, 273-76 (1984). 
 73 See, e.g., FONTENAY, supra note 30, at 488, 497-99; WILKINS, supra note 1, at 251; 
Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 277, 277-78 (1985). 
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Table 1: Summary statistics (all variables used in Section IV) 
 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Observations 
Consider legal 
fees important 
0.503 0.501 0 1 177 
Consider lawyer 
or law firm’s 
prestige 
important 
0.345 0.477 0 1 177 
Consider 
lawyer’s 
Chinese 
background 
important 
0.198 0.400 0 1 177 
Consider 
lawyer’s 
government 
background 
important 
0.119 0.324 0 1 177 
Consider 
recommendation 
by 
acquaintances 
important 
0.203 0.404 0 1 177 
Consider 
headquarters’ 
recommendation 
important 
0.113 0.317 0 1 177 
State ownership 
(50%) 
0.393 0.490 0 1 191 
State ownership 
(10%) 
0.429 0.496 0 1 191 
Investment 
duration 
9.239 9.114 0 36     201 
U.S. revenue 2.452 1.610 1 5 188 
In-house 
counsel 
0.284 0.452 0 1 190 
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Intensity of 
sectoral 
regulation 
0.381 0.487 0 1 210 
To meet existing 
customers’ need 
0.227 0.420 0 1 198 
Length of time 
working in the 
U.S. 
5.561 6.199 0 35 173 
Data source: 2017 CGCC survey 
74
 
Because the dependent variable is binary, we run a series of 
logistic regression tests.  As shown in Table 2, state ownership is 
highly significant.  The odds ratio, which is larger than one, indicates 
a positive association between state ownership of Chinese investors 
and legal fee sensitivity.  In other words, Chinese investors with state 
ownership (measured at either 50% or 10%) are more likely to 
consider legal fees important in selecting U.S. lawyers.  Take the 
results of Model (5) as an example.  When all the other variables are 
held constant, the odds that Chinese investors majority-owned by the 
state consider legal fees important are 187% higher than the odds for 
Chinese investors without majority state ownership. 
 
Table 2: Analysis of the inter-company variation in legal fee 
sensitivity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
State ownership 
(50%) 
2.58***  2.69***  2.87***  2.99**  
State ownership 
(10%) 
 2.75***  2.93***  3.20***  3.09*** 
Intensity of 
sectoral 
regulation 
.64 
 
.60 
 
.56 
 
.53* 
 
.53* 
 
.49* 
 
.45* 
 
.43** 
 
Investment 
duration 
1.02 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.06* 1.06* 
U.S. revenue   .93 .94 .88 .89 .87 .89 
                                                                                                               
 74 China General Chamber of Commerce, CGCC Annual Business Survey Report 2017 
(June 16, 2017), https://www.cgccusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Survey-Report-
2017-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XXN-4Q4K]. 
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In-house 
counsel 
    1.13 1.06 1.05 .95 
To meet the 
needs of 
existing 
customers 
      1.24 1.17 
Length of time 
working in the 
U.S. 
      .96 .96 
Constant .68 .64* .73 .67 .72 .66 .78 .72 
Number of 
observations 
160 160 154 154 152 152 125 125 
Note: Source: CGCC 2017 survey; logistic regression; odds ratio reported and 
rounded up to two decimal points; *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. 
The finding, which is robust across all the model 
specifications, supports the hypothesis that state-owned Chinese 
MNCs are on average more likely to take legal costs seriously.  As 
discussed earlier, state-owned Chinese MNCs tend to centralize 
decision-making authority and impose tight vertical control over their 
U.S. operations.75  Just like their U.S. peers, sizable Chinese MNCs 
usually set a budget for each year’s legal expenses.  And given the 
rigidity of bureaucratic management typical in SOEs, exceeding the 
budget spells trouble.76  To avoid that, local managers strive to keep 
their actual legal expenses close to the planned budget cap, even 
though doing so may affect the quality of the legal services and have 
a long-term negative impact. 
Apart from state ownership, sectoral regulation is significant 
at the 10% level in five of the eight models.  The odds ratios are less 
than one, suggesting that Chinese MNCs in heavily regulated sectors 
are less likely to pay attention to legal fees when selecting U.S. 
lawyers.  Take Model (6) as an example.  With the other variables 
held constant, the odds that Chinese companies operating in heavily 
regulated sectors consider legal fees are about 50% less than the odds 
for those in other sectors.  The finding is intuitive.  As discussed 
earlier, in some sectors, compliance necessitates a steady supply of 
sophisticated legal services, and low-quality services have high-
                                                                                                               
 75 JI LI, THE CLASH OF CAPITALISMS? CHINESE COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES 103 
(2018). 
 76 HENDERSON, supra note 8, at 5, 16. 
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stakes and often imminent impacts on the business.  Dealing with 
state and federal banking regulators, for instance, requires frequent 
assistance from lawyers with extensive practice experience.  Only 
sizable law firms provide services in this area, and they are invariably 
expensive.  In other words, banks operating in the United States, 
regardless of their countries of origin, should be accustomed to costly 
legal services.  Hence the significant and negative association 
between regulatory intensity and legal fee sensitivity. None of the 
other variables is significant. 
B. Lawyers’ or Law Firms’ Prestige 
In selecting U.S. lawyers, some Chinese managers also 
consider their professional reputations (See Figure 1).  Prestige serves 
multiple functions, such as signaling service quality and certifying 
clients’ creditability. 77   Then, why do 65% of Chinese managers 
disregard this factor?  What explains the inter-company variation?  
This subsection formulates and tests several hypotheses.  We 
construct a dummy variable that equals one if a survey respondent 
chose a lawyer’s or a law firm’s prestige as an important 
consideration and zero otherwise.  We discuss below a number of 
possible variables that may correlate with the inter-company 
variation in reputational sensitivity; the coding of the variables is 
detailed in Subsection A. 
State ownership in Chinese investors.  Once again, we begin 
with state ownership in Chinese investors, the key corporate attribute 
that distinguishes Chinese outbound FDI from that of most other 
countries.  We hypothesize that state ownership has an effect on the 
attention to prestige.  Recall the two major functions of professional 
reputation from corporate clients’ perspective: to signal service 
quality and to certify the client’s credibility.  Evidencing the 
certification function, a recent study of the legal profession finds that 
Chinese “SOEs want to be seen as engaging top firms . . . to cast off 
the image of a developing country SOE and be seen as a global 
corporation.” 78   In addition, given the multiple-agency problem 
discussed earlier, managers of state-owned Chinese MNCs may be 
more inclined to shift legal risks to outside lawyers. 
                                                                                                               
 77 DE FONTENAY, supra note 30, at 401. 
 78 STERN & LI, supra note 1, at 192. 
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Sectoral regulation.  The extent to which a sector is regulated 
may affect prestige sensitivity.  Prior research has shown that U.S. 
corporations’ need for regulatory compliance drives their demand for 
legal services.79  In less-regulated sectors where legal services are 
standardized, the sophisticated lawyering skills and rich practice 
experience offered by prestigious firms add marginal value.  As a 
result, Chinese investors in such sectors may be inattentive to prestige.  
By contrast, in sectors governed by complex laws and regulations, 
Chinese MNC managers might seek as much assurance of high-
quality legal services as possible.  Presumably, prestigious law firms 
offer that additional assurance. 
Investment motive.  As noted earlier, a minority of Chinese 
MNCs invest in the United States to serve their Chinese customers 
that have expanded globally.  Occupying a niche market in the United 
States, such Chinese MNCs are under less pressure to adapt to the 
host country’s environment.  Moreover, they do not need prestigious 
U.S. law firms to serve as “reputational intermediaries” in 
transactions with their existing customers. 80   In short, Chinese 
companies “dragged” to the United States might pay less attention to 
a lawyer’s or a law firm’s prestige than those driven by the desire to 
develop the U.S. market from scratch. 
Size of U.S. investment.  The size of Chinese companies’ U.S. 
investment may have some effects on prestige sensitivity. First, 
Chinese MNCs with substantial operations in the United States can 
afford the services of prestigious law firms.  They may also perceive 
hiring lawyers from elite firms as a form of status signal.81  Second, 
with more at stake in the U.S. market, such MNCs may care more 
about the long-term effects of legal services.  Hence professional 
reputation, a proxy for high-quality services, is taken seriously.  Third, 
legal and regulatory complexity typically moves in sync with 
business size, so companies with larger investments are more likely 
to purchase premium services from elite firms.  Of course, one may 
contend that the causal arrow points in the opposite direction—those 
Chinese companies that have chosen prestigious U.S. law firms are 
more likely to mitigate their legal and compliance risks and, 
consequently, thrive in the U.S. market.  However, given that most 
                                                                                                               
 79 SCHWARCZ, supra note 52, at 492. 
 80 See, e.g., KRAAKMAN, supra note 42, at 53; OKAMOTO, supra note 43, at 15. 
 81 STERN & LI, supra note 1, at 192. 
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Chinese MNCs have only recently entered the U.S. market, such a 
long-term effect of compliance, even if it exists, should remain 
latent.82 
Duration of U.S. investment.  The duration of a Chinese 
company’s U.S. operations may be tied to the prestige factor.  Yet, 
the effect is not obvious.  On the one hand, newcomers typically face 
a wider information gap and therefore have to rely more on reputation 
as a signal for service quality.  On the other hand, Chinese companies 
that have just expanded to the United States may be uninformed about 
local lawyers’ or law firms’ prestige.  Lacking such knowledge, they 
cannot use this factor as an effective proxy for service quality.  We 
will test the conflicting hypotheses below. 
In-house counsel.  A Chinese company’s in-house legal 
capacity in the United States may be associated with its managers’ 
attention to professional reputation.  As previously noted, the 
existence of in-house legal staff may signal the legal and regulatory 
complexity of a Chinese company’s business environment.  Hence, 
those with in-house counsel may be more attentive to professional 
reputation.  Yet, again, one may make an opposing argument: 
Companies with in-house lawyers, largely relieved of the information 
asymmetry problem, do not have to count on effective but noisy 
signals of competency such as law firm reputation.83 
  
Table 3: Analysis of the inter-company variation in prestige 
sensitivity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State 
ownership 
(50%) 
1.08  1.05  1.01  
State 
ownership 
(10%) 
 1.01  1.01  .99 
Intensity of 
sectoral 
regulation 
1.95* 1.96* 2.10** 2.10** 1.94* 1.95* 
                                                                                                               
 82 Also, our study, as the first one on this topic, aims mainly at identifying correlation, 
rather than causation. 
 83 RIBSTEIN, supra note 29, at 749. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss1/9
112 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
 
Investment 
duration 
1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
U.S. revenue 1.15 1.15 1.29* 1.29* 1.25 1.25 
In-house 
counsel 
  .47 .47 .56 .56 
To meet the 
needs of 
existing 
customers 
    .83 .83 
Constant .26*** .26*** .26*** .26*** .28*** .28*** 
Number of 
observations 
154 154 152 152 146 146 
Note: Source: CGCC 2017 survey; logistic regression; odds ratio reported and 
rounded up to two decimal points; *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. 
As shown in Table 3, sectoral regulation significantly and 
positively correlates with prestige sensitivity.  This finding is robust 
across all model specifications.  Take the results of Model (6) as an 
example.  With the other variables held constant, Chinese companies 
operating in heavily regulated sectors are 95% more likely to consider 
prestige in selecting U.S. lawyers than those in less regulated sectors.  
This finding suggests that Chinese companies facing higher 
regulatory risks seek the additional assurance of competence and 
reliability offered by prestigious law firms. 
Moreover, in Models (3) and (4), the size of a Chinese MNC’s 
U.S. investment is significant and positively associated with prestige 
sensitivity.84  To use the results from Model (4) as an illustrative 
example, all else being equal, one unit increase in the U.S. revenue 
scale correlates with an increase of 29% in the odds ratio of 
considering prestige in U.S. lawyer selection.  One may infer that 
Chinese investors with substantial stakes in the U.S. market care more 
about the long-term effects of legal services; they are also more 
capable of purchasing premium legal services.  The result, however, 
is not robust, so a more definitive conclusion awaits further research.  
None of the other variables is significant.  
                                                                                                               
 84 The coefficients are almost significant at the 10% in Models (5) and (6); the p value 
is 10.8% for both. 
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C. Recommendations by Chinese Headquarters 
For 11% of Chinese companies, recommendations by their 
Chinese headquarters play a major role in selecting U.S. lawyers.  For 
decades, U.S. law firms have followed MNCs around the globe and 
set up satellite offices in major commercial hubs.85  Now, some of 
these firms may extend their service to MNCs from emerging 
economies such as China.  As noted earlier, numerous international 
law firms have been advising large Chinese companies for over a 
decade.86  These companies, when expanding to the United States, 
may prefer that their U.S. affiliates engage the same law firms.  
Obviously, the existence of headquarters’ knowledge or preference 
about U.S. lawyers preconditions such recommendations.  But apart 
from that, what other factors may bear on the inter-company variation 
in this variable?  To test a number of hypotheses, we code a dummy 
variable that equals one if a survey respondent chose “headquarters’ 
recommendation” as a major consideration in U.S. lawyer selection; 
the dummy equals zero otherwise. 
State ownership in Chinese investors.  State ownership in 
Chinese investors may have an effect.  As noted above, state-owned 
Chinese MNCs tend to centralize decision-making power, and their 
headquarters exercise more strict hierarchical control over their U.S. 
operations than those of privately-owned Chinese MNCs.87  Given 
such control, managers in the United States naturally heed lawyer 
recommendations from their superiors in China. Moreover, Chinese 
SOEs face heightened institutional pressure in the United States, 
which inevitably raises their legal and regulatory risks.88  The agency 
theory would predict that SOE managers, in order to circumscribe 
their liability, may prefer to engage lawyers recommended by their 
headquarters, so if any major legal and compliance issues arise, the 
local managers will not be held responsible. 
Sectoral regulation.  The same agency problem may also link 
sectoral regulation to the consideration of lawyer recommendations 
                                                                                                               
 85 SILVER, supra note 7, at 1432-33. 
 86 STERN & LI, supra note 1, at 185. 
 87 LI, supra note 2, at 104. 
 88 For instance, the national security review of foreign investment in the United States 
discriminates against the acquisitions of U.S. assets by investors controlled by a foreign state. 
For more about the system and how Chinese state-owned investors react to it, see, e.g., Ji Li, 
Investing Near the National Security Black Hole, 14 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 1, 1-44 (2017). 
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from headquarters.  Chinese MNCs in heavily regulated sectors face 
more legal and regulatory risks, so risk-averse managers may shield 
themselves from possible responsibility for violations by deferring to 
the Chinese headquarters on U.S. lawyer selection. 
Investment duration.  The headquarters of Chinese companies 
that have just entered the U.S. market may keep their U.S. divisions 
on a tighter leash.  By comparison, those that have operated in the 
United States for an extended period may have more localized 
management.  As a result, they may discount headquarters’ 
recommendations in lawyer selection. 
In-house legal capacity.  Chinese companies with full-time 
in-house lawyers may rely more on internal knowledge in selecting 
U.S. lawyers, rendering headquarters’ recommendations either 
unnecessary or unimportant. 
Size of U.S. investment.  Chinese companies with substantial 
U.S. investments presumably assert more control.  Conversely, those 
testing the U.S. market anticipate no substantial loss even if their 
investments fail, so local managers may enjoy more autonomy.  
However, the opposite argument may also be true: large U.S. 
operations require on-site management, so local managers downplay 
recommendations from their Chinese superiors.  This variable also 
serves as a baseline, for only sizable Chinese companies have prior 
dealings with elite international law firms in China.  The headquarters 
lacking such experiences will not be able to make proper U.S. lawyer 
recommendations in the first place. 
Length of time working in the U.S. Chinese MNC managers 
who have worked in the United States for years may have acquired 
adequate information about the legal service market.  Thus, they may 
discount any lawyer recommendations from their Chinese 
headquarters.  In comparison, recent expatriates may lack knowledge 
about the local legal market and therefore welcome recommendations 
from headquarters. 
 
Table 4: Analysis of the inter-company variation in considering 
headquarters’ recommendations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
State ownership 
(50%) 
4.40**  4.36**  5.95***  8.49***  
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State ownership 
(10%) 
 4.56**  4.56**  6.90***  12.49*** 
Intensity of sectoral 
regulation 
3.37** 3.14** 3.47** 3.26** 5.00** 4.68** 6.02** 6.15** 
Investment duration .99 1.00 .99 1.00 .95 .95 .92* .92* 
In-house counsel   .83 .78 .37 .33 .39 .31 
U.S. revenue     1.46* 1.50* 1.49* 1.55* 
Length of time 
working in the U.S. 
      1.01 1.02 
Constant .03*** .03*** .04*** .03*** .01*** .01*** .01*** .01*** 
Number of 
observations 
160 160 158 158 152 152 131 131 
Note: Source: CGCC 2017 survey; logistic regression; odds ratio reported and 
rounded up to two decimal points; *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. 
Table 4 presents the test results. State ownership is significant, 
and the odds ratio is larger than one, which indicates that, everything 
else being equal, Chinese companies with state ownership are more 
likely to select U.S. lawyers recommended by their headquarters.  
This finding remains robust across all the model specifications. As 
noted, in comparison to privately owned companies, state-owned 
Chinese investors allocate more decision-making power to their 
headquarters in China. 89   Their centralized and hierarchical 
management contributes to the receptiveness of U.S. managers. 
Moreover, Chinese SOEs in the United States endure more 
institutional pressure in the form of enhanced legal and regulatory 
risks.  For self-protection, risk-averse local managers may be more 
inclined to rely on lawyers recommended by their companies’ 
Chinese headquarters. 
Also significant is the regulatory intensity of the sectors in 
which Chinese investors do business.  The odds ratio is larger than 
one, so Chinese MNCs investing in heavily regulated sectors are 
more likely to heed headquarters’ recommendations in selecting U.S. 
lawyers.  Again, local managers’ intent to mitigate their risk may 
explain the finding.  If the company violates any U.S. law, which 
occurs more frequently in heavily regulated sectors, the local 
managers could defend themselves by pointing fingers at the lawyers 
“designated” by the Chinese headquarters.  Moreover, in heavily 
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regulated sectors, compliance may require extensive central–local 
coordination, and lawyers recommended by the headquarters may be 
better positioned to assume that role. 
The size of investment is also significant, and the odds ratio 
is larger than one, suggesting that Chinese MNCs with large U.S. 
businesses favor lawyers recommended by their headquarters.  We 
submit that Chinese investors with large stakes in the U.S. market 
tend to assert more control over U.S. operations, including the 
consumption of legal services.  Also, as noted, we deploy the variable 
as a control in the tests.  Because international law firms and their 
Asian offices have mostly served large Chinese companies in the past, 
the rest would not have had the opportunity to interact with such law 
firms prior to their U.S. expansion.  Thus, their headquarters are less 
likely to recommend U.S. lawyers in the first place.  None of the other 
variables is significant. 
D. U.S. Government Background 
Roughly 12% of Chinese managers consider a government 
background important in U.S. lawyers (See Figure 1).  This finding 
is intriguing in two ways.  On the one hand, it may baffle scholars 
well-versed in state–business relations in China.  Why do not most 
Chinese MNCs, having been immersed in a home state where power 
trumps law, demonstrate a consistent proclivity to engage lawyers 
with government connections?  Yet, on the other hand, experts on the 
U.S. legal service market may raise quite the opposite question: Why 
would so many Chinese investors consider a U.S. lawyer’s 
government background important?  To test a number of hypothetical 
explanations, we create a dependent dummy variable and assign it the 
value of one if a survey respondent chose “U.S. government 
background” as a major factor to consider in selecting U.S. lawyers 
and zero otherwise. 
State ownership in Chinese investors.  We hypothesize that 
the ownership type of Chinese investors is associated with this 
preference.  Compared to private companies, Chinese SOEs in 
foreign countries generally have to cope with more external pressure 
due to the lack of trust in them.90  So, state-owned Chinese investors 
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may need to legitimize themselves in the eyes of U.S. regulators and 
law enforcement agencies.  Engaging counsels with U.S. government 
backgrounds should help, at least in the eyes of Chinese managers, to 
mitigate the trust deficiency.  Moreover, sizable SOEs enjoy all kinds 
of privileges in their home state, where government agencies are 
often regarded as facilitating peers rather than impartial regulators.91 
Such a mindset may shape the lawyer-selection preference of 
managers at state-owned Chinese MNCs in the United States. 
Sectoral regulation.  Government regulations vary in form 
and extent across different sectors.  In sectors where expansive 
regulations leave ample room for regulatory discretion, lawyers 
boasting a government background are valued for their insider 
knowledge and connections. 92   The United States being an 
administrative state, foreign companies cannot eschew interacting 
with various government agencies.  Those facing more agency 
scrutiny may show a strong preference for U.S. lawyers with 
government experience.93 
Duration of U.S. investment.  For the same reason, investment 
duration may relate to the lawyer selection preference.  Companies 
that just entered the U.S. market may face more pressure to dispel 
suspicion than Chinese companies that have operated in the United 
States for decades and have established a good record of corporate 
citizenship.   
Length of time working in the U.S.  Due to normative or 
mindset inertia, Chinese MNC managers who have recently moved 
to the United States might show a strong preference for U.S. lawyers 
with government connections. As noted earlier, Fisman and Miguel 
demonstrate that UN diplomats from corrupt countries tend to import 
noncompliance behavior to the United States.94  The same logic may 
apply here.  Back in China, connections with government officials are 
crucial to doing business and securing investment,95  and Chinese 
                                                                                                               
 91 LIU, supra note 4, at 769. 
 92 BARTZ & ROUMELIOTIS, supra note 54; WEISSELBERG & LI, supra note 54, at 1221. 
 93 Meanwhile, Chinese SOEs or those heavily controlled by the government tend to 
cluster in such sectors. The correlation may well manifest in a positive association between 
state ownership in Chinese investors and their preference for U.S. lawyers with government 
background. Adding the variable improves test results. 
 94 Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: 
Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1020, 1023 (2007). 
 95 See generally ANG & JIA, supra note 3, at 318; ZHANG & LI, supra note 3, at 3. 
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managers accustomed to the home state business environment may 
retain their faith in the efficacy of government connections for 
resolving tough legal and regulatory issues in the United States. 
In-house counsel.  In-house legal capacity may bear on the 
preference for U.S. lawyers with government backgrounds.  It is 
possible that Chinese companies with full-time legal counsel can 
better navigate the U.S. regulatory system and therefore have less of 
a need to rely on well-connected external lawyers to interact with 
regulatory agencies. 
Size of U.S. investment.  All else being equal, Chinese 
companies with large U.S. investments may handle more regulatory 
issues and therefore interact more frequently with government 
agencies.  As a result, they may prefer U.S. lawyers with connections 
in the government who are familiar with the agencies’ internal 
decision-making mechanisms. 
 
Table 5: Analysis of the inter-company variation in considering 
lawyers’ U.S. government background 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
State ownership 
(50%) 
4.72***  4.93***  5.75***  6.78***  
State ownership 
(10%) 
 4.73***  4.99***  5.54***  4.98** 
Intensity of 
sectoral 
regulation 
1.56 1.45 1.68 1.57 1.46 1.38 1.34 1.35 
Investment 
duration 
.98 .98 .97 .98 .96 .97 .97 .98 
In-house counsel   .52 .50 .47 .44 .32 .30 
U.S. revenue     .84 .86 .86 .88 
Length of time 
working in the 
U.S. 
      .91 .91 
Constant .06*** .06*** .07*** .07*** .12*** .11*** .14*** .14*** 
Number of 
observations 
160 160 158 158 152 152 131 131 
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Note: Source: CGCC 2017 survey; logistic regression; odds ratio reported and 
rounded up to two decimal points; *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. 
As shown in Table 5, state ownership in Chinese investors is 
highly significant across all model specifications, and the odds ratio 
is larger than one.  The finding supports the hypothesis that, 
everything else being equal, state-owned Chinese investors prefer 
their U.S. lawyers to have some government background.  This 
preference probably evinces their intent to remedy the trust 
deficiency.  It is also possible that SOE managers retain their faith in 
the efficacy of government connections.  None of the other variables 
is significant. 
V. CONTRIBUTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
Economic globalization has been reshaping the legal 
profession and market for legal services, and a vast literature has 
explored the topic from diverse angles. 96   Yet, so far few have 
examined the legal impacts of global expansion by emerging-market 
MNCs.  Narrowing the immense knowledge gap, our empirical 
research analyzes lawyer selection by Chinese companies in the 
United States. It makes a number of important practical, policy, and 
theoretical contributions. 
First, practitioners will find valuable insights in this article 
about the service needs of Chinese corporate clients in the U.S. legal 
market.  As previously mentioned, surging Chinese investment in the 
United States brings with it a potential demand for U.S. legal services.  
Lawyers and law firms are competing fiercely for a share of this 
growing business.  However, intuition and anecdotal reports, rather 
than systematic empirical evidence, have been guiding the 
competition.  What do Chinese corporate clients really want?  For 
instance, should U.S. lawyers advertise good government 
connections, if any, in order to attract Chinese clients?  How about 
highlighting lawyers’ pedigrees?  This article presents the first-ever 
empirical evidence that directly addresses these questions.  The 
preference ranking informs U.S. lawyers about what Chinese clients 
consider important in the purchase of legal services.  Moreover, the 
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analysis of the inter-company variations should help U.S. lawyers 
tailor their business development tactics to different Chinese 
corporate clients.  For example, U.S. law firms should calibrate their 
strategies when dealing with state-owned Chinese MNCs, as they 
differ systematically from privately owned Chinese companies in 
several key aspects of lawyer selection, i.e., legal fee sensitivity, 
deference to headquarters’ recommendations, and preference for U.S. 
lawyers with government backgrounds. 
Second, our findings contribute to the policy debate about 
Chinese outbound investments.  While optimists have embraced 
investments from China for their many tangible benefits, which 
include new jobs and low-cost capital, concerns and criticisms are on 
the rise that Chinese MNCs export China’s domestic problems.97  
When operating in the United States, will Chinese investors promptly 
adapt and comply with relevant U.S. laws?  To answer this broad 
question, one cannot avoid analyzing how Chinese MNCs interact 
with “the gatekeepers,” i.e., U.S. lawyers.98  The empirical evidence 
herein strongly suggests that Chinese investors are mindful of the 
importance of professional legal services in navigating the complex 
U.S. legal system.  Though some facets of their U.S. lawyer selection 
exemplify peculiar features of Chinese corporate clients, one may 
nonetheless infer an overall rational intent to traverse the institutional 
gaps and adapt to the U.S. legal and regulatory environment.  Of 
course, first-rate legal service may not always induce astute legal 
actions or full compliance.  Future research should investigate the 
actual role played by U.S. lawyers in the decision-making of Chinese 
MNC executives in the United States. 
Third, this article contributes to several ongoing theoretical 
debates.  We begin with those on MNCs, state-owned enterprises, and 
globalization.  As previously noted, despite the prominence and 
influence of state-owned MNCs, no one has ever researched their 
demand for legal services and their interactions with legal 
professionals in host countries.  Narrowing the gap, this article not 
only uncovers their preferences in U.S. lawyer selection but also 
pinpoints the significant, albeit uneven, effects of state ownership.  
To be more specific, due to centralized bureaucratic control, 
                                                                                                               
 97 For a summary of the two opposing views, see Ji Li, I Came, I Saw, I . . . Adapted an 
Empirical Study of Chinese Business Expansion in the U.S. and Its Legal and Policy 
Implications, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 143, 150–53 (2016). 
 98 Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1387 (2004). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
2019] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 121 
 
heightened institutional pressure, and the acute agency problem, 
Chinese state-owned MNCs pay special attention to legal fees, 
lawyers’ government background, and recommendations from 
headquarters.  In addition, the current study adds to the emerging 
literature on various effects of state corporate ownership, which has 
largely overlooked any effects on companies’ external service 
demands.99  In light of our findings, future research to explore state 
ownership and its impacts should probably adopt a more nuanced 
approach. 
In addition, the study contributes to the scholarship on 
globalization, the legal profession, and the legal service market.  As 
noted, the literature has traditionally revolved around lawyers, law 
firms, and MNCs based in the United States and other developed 
countries.100  In the past decade or so, serious attempts have been 
made to extend such research to developing countries such as China, 
India, and Brazil.101  Yet, few scholars have paid much attention to 
the recent reversal of global investment flow driven mainly by 
surging Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (FDI).  As a first 
step towards filling this research gap, our empirical study suggests 
that Chinese MNCs will have a very limited impact on the U.S. legal 
profession.  True, the majority of Chinese managers, especially those 
working for state-owned Chinese MNCs, are fee-sensitive, which 
may affect how their U.S. lawyers deliver standard legal services.  
According to our study, however, U.S. firms that have developed 
expertise in heavily regulated sectors will be unlikely to lose their 
                                                                                                               
 99 See generally LI, supra note 2; Alessia A. Amighini et al., Do Chinese State-Owned 
and Private Enterprises Differ in Their Internationalization Strategies?, 27 CHINA ECON. 
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Ghana, 23 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 1053 (2014). 
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Chinese clients over hefty fees.  Put differently, instead of wreaking 
havoc on the U.S. market for legal services, growing Chinese 
investments will reinforce the current trend.102  Those offering mere 
standardized and commoditized services will face increasing cost 
pressure, but firms capable of servicing complex transactional, 
compliance, and litigation matters may charge clients (including cost-
conscious Chinese clients) high fees because the price for such 
services remains inelastic, irrespective of the nationality of the 
corporate clients.103 
Also, our findings add to the scholarship on the value of 
business lawyers, for which scholars have proposed several 
theoretical explanations.  In a nutshell, business lawyers create value 
by functioning as “transaction cost engineers” 104  or “reputational 
intermediaries,” 105  or by reducing regulatory costs 106  or deal 
information costs. 107   While the theoretical debate continues, 
empirical research is lacking in the context of foreign corporate 
clients’ need for U.S. legal services.  The finding in Section IV that 
Chinese MNCs in heavily regulated sectors take professional 
reputations seriously confirms the theory that business lawyers add 
value by reducing their clients’ regulatory costs.108  Meanwhile, the 
finding that investment duration is insignificant in any of the 
statistical tests calls into question the theory that analogizes 
transactional lawyers to “reputational intermediaries.” 109  
Presumably, those Chinese MNCs that entered the U.S. market early 
have established an observable track record and therefore have less 
need for the certification of prestigious firms.  Therefore, the fact that 
investment duration does not correlate with reputational sensitivity 
casts doubt on the validity of the theory. 
Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the burgeoning 
literature on the adaptation of emerging market MNCs to host country 
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institutions.110  Chinese companies in the domestic setting tend to 
undervalue legal services, and anecdotal reports suggest mindset 
inertia when they expand to developed markets.111  However, the 
evidence herein suggests the opposite.  For instance, though clients 
in China put enormous cost pressure on law firms, in the United 
States, more Chinese companies are concerned with lawyers’ practice 
experience than with their legal fees.  Of course, this sanguine take 
will be more robust if future empirical research can demonstrate that 
Chinese MNCs, aided by local lawyers, comply with U.S. laws and 
regulations at levels comparable to U.S. domestic companies.  Future 
studies should also compare the set of factors considered important 
by Chinese investors and investors from other capital-exporting 
countries. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The expansion of emerging market multinationals, especially 
multinationals based in China, has ushered in a new era of economic 
globalization.  Two features distinguish it from earlier waves of FDI: 
First, most of these MNCs have survived and thrived in a home state 
environment where law often plays a secondary role.  Second, the 
state tends to intervene extensively in the management of the MNCs 
and their business dealings, either directly, through equity ownership 
and personnel control, or indirectly, through directives or fiats.  
Accustomed to such an institutional context, emerging market MNCs 
face daunting challenges when investing in developed countries.  To 
navigate the stricter and more complex legal systems of their host 
states, these MNCs rely on local lawyers; the disruption of the global 
economic order under the Trump administration has further 
strengthened their reliance.  Few scholars have so far examined this 
novel and important phenomenon.  To begin to fill this gap, this 
article empirically investigates how Chinese MNCs select their U.S. 
lawyers.  It finds that Chinese managers uniformly emphasize 
practice experience and ignore lawyers’ educational credentials.  
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Legal fees matter, but to a much lesser degree than what anecdotal 
reports have implied.  Some Chinese MNC managers also consider 
prestige, Chinese background, recommendations by acquaintances, 
U.S. government background, and headquarters’ recommendations.  
Overall, the distribution of the factors (See Figure 1) portrays an 
image of rational foreign investors adapting to multiple institutions, 
including the host country’s legal environment. 
Further statistical analysis of the inter-company variations, 
however, reveals interesting and uneven connections between state 
ownership in Chinese investors and their selection of U.S. lawyers.  
Sectoral regulation, in-house legal capacity, and U.S. investment size 
are tied to one or several of the lawyer selection considerations.  The 
findings help law firms in the United States and other developed 
countries to understand their potential clients from China.  They also 
fill major gaps in the literatures about economic globalization, 
emerging-market MNCs and their adaptation to host country 
institutions, SOEs and Chinese FDI, the corporate counsel movement, 
and the impacts of investment from China and other emerging 
economies on the legal profession and legal service markets of 
developed countries. 
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